This paper provides evidence on the ex-post, shock-coping impact of weather index insurance from a pioneering, large-scale insurance program in Mexico implemented at the municipality level to cover smallholder farmers as a social safety net. Exploiting insurance thresholds as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in insurance payments, we find evidence that these payments allow farmers to cultivate a larger land area in the growing season following a weather shock. Households in municipalities receiving payments also have larger per capita expenditures and income in the subsequent year. These results suggest the insurance payments can make smallholder farmers more resilient to shocks, although some of the full impact may be offset by reductions in remittances from abroad that act as informal insurance.
Introduction
Weather is an important determinant of income for rural populations in developing countries.
The short-term impacts of weather shocks can compound into long-term reductions in investments and growth, often resulting in poverty traps (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011) . In the absence of formal insurance markets, smallholder farmers typically resort to self-insuring through their choices of low-risk and low-profit investments (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Barnett et al., 2008) .
They also turn to coping strategies, such as selling assets, that reduce their ability to generate income in the future (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) . All in all, the risk management and shock coping mechanisms used by the poor to protect themselves against uninsured weather risks are typically insufficient and contribute to low production and poverty.
This relationship between weather shocks and poverty is of particular concern given the likelihood that extreme weather realizations, particularly unusually warm temperatures but also drought and floods in some regions, will become more common as a result of climate change (IPCC, 2013) .
Both extreme temperature and precipitation events have the potential to substantially depress rural incomes through their effects on agricultural production (Rosenzweig et al., 2002; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Lobell et al., 2011) . Indeed, there is evidence that decline in yields attributable to increased climate variability has prompted outmigration from affected areas, suggesting that these impacts on agricultural production are economically significant Feng et al., 2010) . Agricultural insurance has been proposed as a potential adaptation to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change on agricultural production (Lobell and Burke, eds, 2010) , while recent scholarship has also acknowledged the challenges that these efforts have faced.
Traditional indemnity-based insurance, where individual damages have to be assessed by a certified loss adjuster, is considered too costly to apply to smallholder farmers in developing countries (Hazell, 1992) . Index-based weather insurance has emerged as a tool with the potential of providing small-scale farmers with coverage against covariate weather shocks ( Barnett and Mahul, 2007; Alderman and Haque, 2008) . In this case, payments are triggered by indicators of weather events, such as rainfall or an average small area yield, falling below (or above) a verifiable threshold, without the need for individual assessment of losses. While greatly promising, demand for index insurance as currently defined and implemented has been low at market prices (Cole et al., 2013) . Barrett (2016) . The most important barriers to adoption are basis risk, whereby some risks are uninsured due to discrepancy between measured weather indicators and what happens in a farmer's field (McIntosh et al., 2015; Clarke, 2016) , and high cost due in part to lack of data in calculating a fair price (Carter, 2012) . Other research has found that low demand can be attributed in part to lack of trust and liquidity constraints (Cole et al., 2013) , as well as the predominant format of individual policies for farmers who may be part of cooperatives (de Janvry et al., 2014) .
The literature regarding the impact of weather index insurance has generally focused on its effect on ex-ante investment decisions. Many of these studies find that farmers offered index insurance take on riskier but more profitable investments consistent with risk management theory. Studies in India have found that these changes come in the form of shifting production towards riskier, but higher yielding crops or varieties (Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2013; Cole et al., 2017) . Others have found index insurance to increase fertilizer use on maize in Ghana (Karlan et al., 2014 ) and on tobacco in China (Cai, 2016) . However, the impact of index insurance on the adoption of high-value crops is not uniformly positive. Giné and Yang (2009) find that bundling index insurance with a loan to purchase higher-yielding groundnut and maize varieties actually reduces adoption relative to the case where only the loan is provided. Additional theoretical work by Carter et al. (2016) has identified the conditions under which index insurance can have the largest impact on technology adoption.
The ex ante investment decisions made by farmers naturally have impacts on ex post outcomes, such as the value of harvest, consumption, and subsequent investment decisions. Karlan et al. (2014) find that insured farmers have larger total farm revenue, post-harvest assets, and importantly from a shock-coping perspective, are less likely to report missed meals. In contrast, using a differencein-difference specification, Cole et al. (2017) find that larger insurance payouts do not result in significantly different levels of subsequent investment, labor supply, or asset values. However, insured farmers who receive larger payments do report significantly lower consumption, perhaps due to their riskier investment decisions. Other papers have given a greater focus to the ex post shock-coping effects of index insurance. One such paper, Janzen and Carter (2013) , finds that the provision of livestock index insurance reduces potentially costly strategies to cope with shocks by pastoralists in Kenya, such as lowering consumption (for the poorer households) and selling livestock assets (for the richer households). Similarly, Jensen et al. (2017) and Bertram-Huemmer and Kraehnert (2018) find positive welfare impacts of livestock index insurance with the former finding that insurance reduces distress sales of livestock and increases income, while the latter finds that insurance helps farmers recover from decreases in herd size induced by weather shocks.
It is important to note that these estimates of ex post impacts primarily rely on comparing insured households to uninsured households. Thus, the outcomes are driven both by any ex ante changes in risk management behavior as well as the shock-coping value of insurance payments. Our paper differs from the existing literature in that it seeks to isolate the impact of insurance payments alone. Specifically, we study the ex-post impact of payments provided through weather index insurance in the context of a large-scale government-funded insurance program. This program, which goes by the name of CADENA, was pioneered by the Mexican government as a social safety net for severe weather shocks. CADENA insures smallholder farmers and has achieved widespread coverage by having state and federal governments, rather than individual farmers, pay the insurance premiums. By 2013, CADENA insured approximately 12 million hectares of cropland (FAO, 2014) .
The expansive coverage and relatively long tenure of the CADENA program also stand in contrast to the Randomized Control Trial settings in which the impact of index insurance has generally been studied. To identify the effect of insurance payments, we exploit thresholds built into the insurance program in a regression discontinuity design. This design allows us to compare municipalities that received similar weather shocks such that differences in observed ex-post outcomes are attributable to insurance payments alone and do not rely on assumptions about how the program was rolled out over time. Consequently, the effects we estimate should be net of any risk management effects induced by introduction of the insurance. 1 .
While a more complete evaluation of the program would also incorporate its effect on risk management practices, the conditions of the program rollout do not support a research design that could identify these effects. Nevertheless, we believe that understanding the ex-post effects of insurance payments, isolated from changes in the risk profile of investments, provides valuable insights for understanding index insurance. We also contribute to the literature on the use of index insurance as part of a social safety net. In this respect, our paper is similar to Jensen et al. (2017) which finds that the average cost of the index insurance is similar to that of cash transfers but the marginal cost is much lower, suggesting that it may be a more cost-effective method of expanding social protection schemes. This analysis provides evidence that insurance payments allow farmers to cultivate larger land areas in subsequent growing seasons, consistent with the presence of credit constraints that result in diminished investment following a weather shock. Though we cannot completely alternative hypotheses, we provide evidence that our results are most likely to be explained through this credit constraint mechanism. The insurance payments also result in higher household expenditures per capita, indicating welfare gains, although some of the benefits may be offset by a reduction in private transfers from abroad. It should also be noted that the regression discontinuity design implies that we are not able to obtain the average treatment effect of insurance payments, rather we obtain the local average treatment effects for municipalities whose weather realizations are just around the insurance cut-off. The treatment effect of CADENA payments in these municipalities is likely to be different, probably smaller, than the treatment effect in municipalities who have suffered more severe shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background about the CADENA program and outlines the data used in the evaluation. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy, while sections 4 and 5 present and discuss the results, respectively. Section 6 provides falsification tests in support of the identification strategy, and section 7 concludes.
Background and Data
With a rural population of approximately 27 million and two-thirds of the country's poor living in rural localities (INEGI, 2010) , reducing exposure to weather risks is an important component of poverty reduction efforts in Mexico, and climate change is only increasing its importance. Models linking crop yields to weather suggest that climate impacts have substantially reduced yield gains for wheat in Mexico over the period 1980 -2008 (Lobell et al., 2011 . Worldwide, the authors project that climate trends have reduced maize production, an important staple crop in Mexico, by approximately 3.8% over this same time period. To address the joint problems of poverty and uncertainty arising from climate change, the federal government began the CADENA weather index insurance program in 2003, administered through the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA). The purpose of this program is to provide relief to smallholder farmers when crop failures occur and to do so in a way that makes government expenditures more predictable than standard relief programs. In interviews, farmers also reported that the CADENA program made relief payments more predictable and equitable. The federal government promotes the use of insurance by subsidizing up to 90% of premium payments paid by state governments (86% on average from 2003-2011), 2 while reducing the percentage of funds it contributes to ex-post relief via the Direct Support scheme (Apoyos Directos) from 70% in 2003 to 50% in 2011 (Arias et al., 2014) . The amount of relief per hectare provided to farmers is intended to be the same regardless of the source of funds.
CADENA began with drought index insurance covering small maize and sorghum farmers in one state of Mexico. It has expanded significantly since its inception in both geographic scope and breadth of coverage. 3 It now offers weather index insurance for a variety of perils (e.g., drought, flood, and hail), as well as area-based yield index insurance that provides payment when the average yield in an area, as determined by a random sample of plots, falls below a given threshold.
CADENA also offers traditional and remote sensing index insurance for livestock. Between 2003 and 2011, the Mexican government, both state and federal, paid approximately USD 382 million in CADENA premiums and made transfers of USD 352 million to insured farmers (Arias et al., 2014) . This analysis will focus on the drought index insurance because it has historically been CADENA's largest component, and it is the only type of insurance for which we have the weather station and thresholds associated with each policy. Drought insurance is also of particular interest given that 80% of the weather shocks resulting in severe agricultural losses in Mexico can be attributed to drought (Fuchs and Wolff, 2011) . In what follows we simply refer to this insurance as index insurance.
Through the index insurance component of the program, CADENA currently insures farmers growing staple crops on less than 20 hectares of rainfed land, who are then automatically enrolled in the program at no cost to them (SAGARPA, 2014) . As of 2011, CADENA covered 56% of smallholder farmers eligible for government transfers, a percentage which has presumably increased 2 Subsidies from the federal government depend on the marginality index of the insured municipality, as computed by CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Población).
3 CADENA's gradual expansion is a result of a number of factors. First of all, only municipalities sufficiently close to a weather station were eligible for index insurance. As the program expanded to traditional insurance, the coverage area also expanded. Secondly, climactic models to assess risk for individual municipalities were developed gradually. Lastly, states also had the choice of which municipalities to insure and these choices could have changed over time.
as the program has expanded to additional municipalities (Arias et al., 2014) . However, individual farmers are not directly insured. Instead, state governments buy insurance policies associated with a particular crop and municipality. 4 In order to determine the area to be insured, the state government depends on extension agents and local leaders (e.g., ejido leaders) to report how many hectares are being sowed with eligible crops (i.e., maize, beans, sorghum, barley) by farmers with less than 20 hectares of land. This same information is used to distribute insurance payments in the event of a weather shock.
Each policy is assigned a corresponding weather station and provides coverage during three predetermined phases of the production cycle that run from planting, to growing, and to harvesting. 5
The three phases of the insurance policy and the associated precipitation thresholds are tailored to individual municipalities and crops. If precipitation as measured by the designated weather station falls below the threshold in any of the three phases, the insurer makes payouts to the state, which in turn transfers these to eligible farmers in the insured area. States have some discretion in using these funds, such as directing them towards investments that will benefit the affected communities or providing temporary employment to individuals in affected communities. In figure   1 , we provide an example of the policy thresholds and actual precipitation (cumulative and daily) for two municipalities. The municipality in panel a would not receive a payment from that policy because its cumulative precipitation has exceeded the insurance threshold in each phase of the growing cycle. In contrast, the municipality shown in panel b, would receive payment because its cumulative precipitation in the first phase fell below the insurance threshold for that phase. Because of restrictions regarding the maximum distance between the weather station and the insured area, a municipality may be insured by multiple policies each linked to a different station. Conversely, multiple municipalities can have policies linked to a single weather station.
The data for this evaluation come primarily from four sources. The policy data from SAGARPA include the area insured by crop type (i.e., maize, beans, sorghum, barley), the rainfall thresholds and corresponding stations, and record of all payments for each insured municipality for the period 2005 to 2013, the years for which data was made available to us. The area insured by a given policy is the total number of hectares growing one of the four insurable crops by eligible farmers in a municipality. If there are multiple policies linked to one municipality-crop pair, the area insured corresponds to the total number of insured hectares for which a given station is the closest eligible weather station. Occasionally, the stations and thresholds associated with a given municipality can change as insurance companies update their models or certain weather stations are deemed to have data of insufficient quality. 6 Weather data from the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) allow us to calculate the precipitation at each of the weather stations linked to an insurance policy, which in turn is compared to the policy thresholds and used to determine if that policy should have paid out.
To determine the effect of insurance payments on yields and areas planted, we use agricultural production data from SAGARPA detailing the annual hectares sowed, hectares harvested, and total production in metric tons at the municipality-crop level. Lastly, to study the economic impacts of the insurance, we use national household income and expenditure surveys (ENIGH) which are carried out every other year with the latest one available in 2014. These household expenditure and income surveys are repeated cross-sections of households with a rotating sample of municipalities. 7
Households are surveyed between the months of August and November and the income, expenditure, and remittance variables refer to the previous three months. The analysis sample when using ENIGH data is limited to households living in rural localities. The Mexican Statistical Institute (INEGI) defines rural localities as those with less than 2,500 inhabitants. Although the policy data is available at the level of the weather station 8 , the exact geographic area that a policy covers is not defined, such that we are only able to match policies to outcome data at the municipality level. Thus, the running variable and treatment variables in all of our regressions will vary only at municipality level even in the regressions using economic outcomes, which are measured at the household level. We discuss these issues in more detail in the subsequent section, which explains our empirical strategy.
Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the effect of insurance payouts made through the CADENA program on post-shock production decisions and other coping mechanisms, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
While an index insurance would seem to provide an ideal setting for a sharp regression discontinuity because payment should be decided solely by the value of precipitation relative to some threshold, we have some data limitations that result in a fuzzy regression discontinuity. As discussed above, we only observe payment and outcome variables at the municipality level, but policies are actually defined at the weather station level. We have the same weather station data used by the insurer, provided the primary station was used to determine the payout. However, we cannot link payments to an individual weather station. Thus, we have decided to define our treatment variable as the share of area sowed that receives payment, creating a fuzzy discontinuity. 9 We describe exactly how these variables are created in the remainder of this section.
Our analysis sample is limited to those municipalities that were insured through drought index insurance policies between the years 2005 and 2013. Using weather data provided by CONAGUA, we match policies to their corresponding weather stations and calculate the to-8 The area insured and precipitation thresholds are available at the weather station level, while payouts are only available at the municipality level 9 We should also note that in a small number of cases, the payment status does not match what would be expected from rainfall realizations. These are likely instances in which backup stations, which we are not included in the policy information provided to us, are used because of missing data at the primary station.
tal precipitation recorded at that station within each of the three phases of the production cycle designated in the policy. We then subtract the policy-specific precipitation threshold from the realized precipitation to obtain deviations from the threshold for each of the three phases, X mcsti = precip mcsti − threshold mcsti , where m indexes the municipality, c the crop, s the weather station, t the year, and i the phase. A policy results in payment if precipitation at the corresponding weather station falls below the pre-determined threshold in any of the three phases.
In an ideal setting, we would observe insurance payments and all relevant outcomes for precisely the area covered by the policy. The running variable in this setting would be the minimum deviation from the threshold at a given weather station over the three phases of the policy:
X mcst = min i∈{1,2,3} {X mcsti }. Because we only observe payment and outcome variables at the municipality level, we define the running variable at the municipality-crop-year level as the minimum deviation from the threshold over all the weather stations associated with a given municipality,
We recognize concerns that defining the running variable this way can introduce measurement error, in a way that might result in a weak first stage and overstate our treatment effect. However, given the data limitations, we feel this is the best we can do. Additionally, the reduced form results should not suffer from this problem. In defining the treatment variable, we also have to account for the fact that there is substantial heterogeneity in the intensity of the treatment among municipalities receiving payment because some municipalities may have received payouts on 25% of their insured area and others may have received payment on 100%. In addition, there exists variation in terms of the percentage of agricultural land in the municipality that is insured via CADENA, since the policy is limited to land cultivated by producers with less than 20 hectares of land. Thus, the treatment variable (T ) is defined as the total number of hectares (across all weather stations linked to a given municipality) that received a payout divided by the number of hectares of land devoted to that crop in a given municipality:
To account for the fact that municipalities that received insurance payments may have different weather realizations than those that do not, we instrument treatment with an indicator for falling below the threshold and limit our sample to a narrow bandwidth from the normalized threshold of zero. This regression will give causal estimates so long as the precipitation measured at the weather station cannot be manipulated to obtain payouts, such that potential outcomes are smooth over the normalized threshold. We will provide evidence that this assumption holds in section 6.
We begin by estimating the first stage of our regression via the following equation:
where Z mct = 1{X mct < 0} is an indicator for falling below the threshold amount of rainfall and serves as an instrument for treatment, while δ c 0 is a crop fixed effect. We then estimate the equation below, using the instrumented treatment variable T mct obtained from equation 1. 10
The coefficient β 2SLS measures the marginal effect of a change in the percentage area receiving payment in municipality m at time t on the outcome of interest y mct+1 at time t + 1. Outcomes of interest include area planted, yield, expenditure, income, and remittances. The analysis is restricted to insurable crops (i.e., maize, beans, sorghum, and barley) unless we explicitly note otherwise. Household level regressions using ENIGH data are estimated with a similar set of regressions, where observations are no longer indexed by crop c, but are now indexed by h to indicate an individual household.
Main Results

Descriptive statistics
We begin by looking at some descriptive statistics for the analysis sample in Given its roles as a social safety net, CADENA is designed to ensure relatively rare events. We confirm this in panel a, where we see that the mean of the running variable (deviation from the precipitation threshold) is 71 mm, suggesting that in an average year a municipality can expect to receive rainfall well in excess of the threshold. Additionally, only 11% of the observations in our sample have rainfall realizations that fall below the insurance threshold. 12 Turning to panels b and c, we see evidence that points to a strong first stage, which will be formally tested in a subsequent section. Specifically, the mean of the running variable is well above zero for municipalities that do not receive payment in a given year (panel b), and only four percent of these observations receive rainfall below the threshold. We contrast these results with municipalities that receive payment in that year (panel c), and we see that the mean of the running variable is negative (i.e., precipitation falls below the threshold) and 77% of these observations have rainfall realizations that should trigger insurance, as would be expected if these rainfall thresholds are generally enforced. Policy rules to deal with missing data may explain the imperfect compliance we observe. Specifically, the policy rules state that missing data is filled in with a secondary weather station, which we do not observe, so long as the number of days with missing information does not exceed 20% at a weather station.
Despite the imperfect implementation, there is a strong first stage, which we will formally show in the following subsection. To understand the severity of shocks covered through CADENA's drought index insurance, we explore in more detail the relationship between rainfall and yields prior to the introduction of CADENA. In figure 2, we plot a local regression of log yield on total precipitation in the growing season. 13 The points on the graph represent the average yield in 50 mm bins, taking observations 13 We define the growing season as the period covered by the insurance policy once CADENA comes into effect.
over all crops and municipalities in our sample period. 14 As can be seen, there is a positive relationship between precipitation and yields until about 1,000 mm of precipitation. To put this result in context, the average insurance threshold is about 230 mm of precipitation over the entire growing season, and the average yield at this level of precipitation is about 37% of the median yield. 15 We take this as evidence that farmers who depend on rainfed agriculture suffer losses when precipitation falls below the thresholds established in the insurance policies. This fact is useful to contextualize the effects we observe in subsequent analyses. Note. This figure depicts the relationship between log yield and precipitation for insurable crops (maize, beans, barley, and sorghum) before CADENA is rolled out in each municipality beginning in 2001 (e.g., if a municipality is insured for the first time in 2008, we include observations up to 2007). The last year included in the sample for any municipality is 2012. Each circle depicts the average of log yield for all observations (municipality-crop-year) within 50 mm precipitation bins. The size of the circle represents the number of observations. The blue line depicts a loess smoother, while the gray shaded area represents the 5% confidence interval.
Agricultural outcomes
To ensure the validity of the research design, we must first verify that our treatment variable changes discontinuously across the insurance threshold. In panel a of figure 3, we group municipality-level observations into 5 mm bins based on the value of the running variable, and 14 A plot using residuals of a regression of log yield on crop fixed effects looks very similar. 15 The thresholds are defined separately for three different parts of the growing season. For illustrative purposes, we sum the three thresholds for each municipality and average over all municipalities to obtain 230 mm.
plot the probability that a municipality receives any insurance payment in each bin. We see that the probability of receiving any payment at the municipality level increases by approximately 50 percentage points at the insurance threshold. Meanwhile, panel 3b gives a graphical representation of the first stage, showing a 20 point increase in the average percentage of hectares that receive payment (at the municipality level) when rainfall falls below the insurance threshold. Given that the average treated municipality receives payment for about 45% of its agricultural land, this result is equivalent to the 50% increase in the probability of receiving any payment seen in panel a. One of the stated aims of the CADENA program is to ensure that farmers who have suffered negative weather shocks have sufficient resources to purchase inputs for the next growing season.
We cannot observe input purchase, but if the insurance is serving its intended purposes, these input purchases should be translating into improved agricultural outcomes in either the area planted or the yields achieved. Thus, we begin this analysis by estimating the effect of insurance payment on the change in log hectares sowed from t to t + 1 and the log yield in t + 1. Table 2 shows the results of estimating equations 1 and 2 with ∆ log hectares planted and log yield of insured crops as the outcomes. Column 1 reports the results for ∆ log hectares planted using the optimal bandwidth, which was calculated following the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014 Calonico et al. ( , 2015 . 16 Using the 50 mm bandwidth, we find a reduced form effect of approximately 8% reported in panel b. Panel c reports the two-stage least squares estimate of 0.39, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This estimate implies that for a given crop, increasing the percentage of hectares that received payment from 0 to 100% would increase the amount of land devoted to that crop by 39% relative to the previous year. Given that the average treatment municipality receives payment for 45% of its land, we would expect the average effect of receiving payment to be approximately 17%. Note. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Observations are at the municipality-crop-year-level. Agricultural production is for the corresponding insured crop (maize, beans, sorghum, and barley), and log yield refers to log(metric tons per hectare). All regressions include crop fixed effects. Panel a shows results from the OLS estimation of the first stage, which corresponds to estimating equation 1. Panel b shows results from the OLS estimation of the reduced form, which corresponds to estimating equation 2, and panel c displays 2SLS estimates. Columns 1 and 4 are estimated with a linear polynomial of the running variable on a sample of observations within the optimal bandwidth of 50 mm. Columns 2 and 5 include state fixed effects and municipality characteristics (e.g., population, % indigenous from the 2010 census). Columns 3 and 6 are estimated using a linear polynomial on a sample of observations within an alternative bandwidth of 70 mm.
In columns 2 and 3, we show alternative specifications for robustness. Column 2 includes state fixed effects and a number of district level covariates, 17 which are not needed for identification but could provide greater precision. The point estimates do not change substantially for the area regression, neither does the precision of the estimates. Column 3 shows results for a larger bandwidth of 70 mm, for which the coefficient estimate is somewhat smaller in magnitude and no longer significant. 18 The direction of the change is consistent with the fact that the optimal bandwidth should minimize the downward bias induced by comparing municipalities with very different weather realizations. That is, municipalities that received insurance payments also had more negative weather realizations than those that did not receive payments. For the log yield 19 regressions, none of the results are statistically significant and the point estimates are less stable. To understand how these results line up with what theory might predict, let us recall that the effects we observe in these regressions should largely be free of any risk management effect. While theory suggests that receiving insurance coverage for the first time might lead a farmer to make riskier but higher-yield investments, we do not necessarily expect to see a yield effect of insurance payments when the comparison group is farmers in municipalities who are also insured but do not receive insurance payments. We will discuss in section 5 how a land response with no accompanying yield response is consistent with certain models of farmer behavior.
In table 3, we analyze the impact of insurance payment on total area planted, including noninsured crops. Using a bandwidth of 50 mm, reported in column 1, we find a point estimate of 0.288. The estimates are robust and remain significant across the alternate specifications included in columns 2 and 3. These results suggest that farmers are not simply displacing uninsured crops to increase cultivation of insured crops, but actually expanding the total land area under cultivation, presumably by utilizing land that might otherwise have been left fallow. Nevertheless, the point estimate when considering all crops is about 73% as large as the estimate when considering only insured crops. In the average municipality, 76% of the land is devoted to insured crops, which suggests that the increase in total land area is coming almost exclusively from the expansion of 17 These covariates are state fixed effects, municipal land area cultivated by small (< 20 hectares) Procampo beneficiaries, as well as municipal population, average education, percentage of population that is indigenous, and female work force participation as reported in the 2010 census.
18 The first stage is only significant for a smaller bandwidth of 30, but the reduced form results for land area remained quite similar.
19 Yield is measured in metric tons per hectare insured crops. Note. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Observations are at the municipality-year-level. Hectares sowed are defined as the total hectares growing any rainfed agricultural crop as reported in SAGARPA production data. Panel a shows results from the OLS estimation of the first stage, which corresponds to estimating equation 1. Panel b shows results from the OLS estimation of the reduced form, which corresponds to estimating equation 2, and panel c displays 2SLS estimates. Column 1 is estimated with a linear polynomial on a sample of observations within the optimal bandwidth of 50 mm. Column 2 includes state fixed effects and municipality characteristics (e.g., population, % indigenous from the 2010 census). Column 3 is estimated using a linear polynomial on a sample of observations within an alternative bandwidth of 70 mm.
Economic outcomes
Next, we turn to economic outcomes as measured in the household income and expenditure surveys. Panel c of table 4 reports the 2SLS estimates of the effect of insurance payment on log expenditures per capita and log income per capita and remittances per capita. 20 In column 1, we see the point estimate for log expenditures per capita using the optimal bandwidth. The point estimate is large at 0.613, although it is only significant at the the 10% level. Adding covariates, somewhat reduces the magnitude of the point estimate, as seen in column 2, but it greatly improves precision. Column 3 reports the results of a regression using a larger bandwidth of 70 mm and no covariates. This point estimate is somewhat smaller in magnitude to the first two estimates.
As with the agricultural regressions, a slight decrease in the point estimate when using the larger 20 Remittances are in levels rather than logs due to the large number of zero values for this variable.
bandwidth is consistent with what we would expect. Column 4 reports a point estimate for log income per capita of 0.852, which is significant at the 5% level. Thus, going from a municipality that receives no payment to the average treatment municipality (i.e., 45% treated) we would expect increases in expenditure and income per capita of approximately 22-27% and 32-38%, respectively.
Columns 5 and 6 report the log income results for alternative specifications, where we obtain somewhat smaller but still large and positive coefficient estimates. Columns 7 through 9 report the coefficients for remittances per capita received in the previous three months. The estimates suggest that the average treatment household receives between 222 and 275 pesos (17-22 USD) 21 less remittances per capita relative to a household receiving no payment. The unconditional mean of remittances per capita is approximately 253 pesos (20 USD 2013). Thus, these estimates suggest a very large, albeit imprecisely estimated effect. To better understand these effects, we would like to compare the size of the insurance payments to the effects on income and consumption. Since our record of payments is at the municipality and not the household level, we do not have data that would allow us to directly measure the average 21 All pesos to dollar conversions are based on 2013 exchange rates. payment per household only for those households within the bandwidth. Instead, we use the average land area reported in focus group interviews and multiply that by the uniform payment per hectare that the program provides. 22 The majority of farmers reported having between 4 and 8 hectares of land. On average, about half of the insured hectares receive payments of 1,500 pesos/ha, such that the average household could expect to receive between 3,000 and 6,000 pesos (235 -470 USD).
Meanwhile, we observe that household income and expenditures per capita increase about 30 to 40% as a result of payment. The mean of both total household expenditures and total household income in the sample of rural localities is approximately 20,000 pesos (1,568 USD) 23 , such that an increase of 30 to 40% implies 6,000 to 8,000 pesos (470 -627 USD) in additional income. The timing of the survey is such that this increase in income should come primarily from increases in the value of the harvest or investments made in other income-producing activities using the insurance payments. A minority of the households in the sample may be receiving substantially delayed CADENA payments within this period of time.
Thus, if we ignore the effect on remittances for a moment, these results suggest that every peso provided in insurance payment results in 1.0 to 2.7 additional pesos of income and/or expenditure for farmers, keeping in mind that the coefficients underlying this calculation are rather imprecise. Now, the point estimates suggest that remittances decrease by about 1,100 pesos (863 USD) per household (mean household size of about 4). This result implies that the gross increase in other income sources for treated households must be approximately 7,100 to 9,100 pesos (556 -705 USD), which in turn changes the rate of return modestly to be in the range of 1.2 to 3.0 pesos of additional gross income per peso of insurance payment. This is a large multiplier effect on insurance payouts, comparable to the 1.5 to 2.6 range observed for Procampo transfers to a similar smallholder farmer population in Mexico (Sadoulet et al., 2001 ).
Since CADENA is an index insurance program serving as a social safety net, we would ideally like to compare the above mentioned benefits to alternative social protection programs. However, we are unable to provide this comparison because our analysis does not allow us to quantify the full benefits of the program for two reasons. The first is that we cannot measure changes in risk management behavior induced by the CADENA program, which have the potential to substantially increase the total monetary value of the benefits. Second, while the regression discontinuity design provides a clean source of identification, it does not allow us to identify the average treatment effect of insurance payments, only the local average treatment effect around the insurance thresholds. It is possible that municipalities that suffer more severe weather shocks, and thus more damage, would see even more benefits from the insurance payment, such that our results are actually underestimating the positive impact of CADENA. Lastly, we do not have data on either the costs or benefits of relief programs prior to CADENA that would allow us to make comparisons even with imperfect estimates of the value of CADENA.
However, we can try to allay certain concerns that the basis risk inherent in index insurance may result in a reduction in welfare relative to previous ways of providing reliefs, specially for municipalities that are prone to relatively less severe but frequent shocks. Based on the farmers' perceptions, this does not appear to be the case. As we mentioned in the introduction, farmers report that the CADENA program made relief payments more predictable and equitable. In cases where the realized precipitation is just slightly above the threshold but there have been damages, the state can still apply for funds through the Direct Support scheme, although this requires approval from the Federal government and higher degree of cost-sharing. Lastly, the fact that the insurance is tailored to the insured crop and municipality, makes it less likely that some municipalities will systematically receive payments more frequently than others.
The effect on remittances is in line with the research finding that formal transfers may substitute informal risk sharing mechanisms or other transfers. Albarran and Attanasio (2003) show that the cash transfers provided by the PROGRESA program in Mexico crowd out private transfers. Yang and Choi (2007) and Cox et al. (2004) study this phenomenon in the context of the Philippines and find that private transfers are highly sensitive to changes in income. These two studies point to the role of remittances as insurance. As such, it is reasonable to think that when formal insurance payments are made, the need for remittances to cope with shocks is diminished. An alternative way of interpreting this result is that remittances make up for the basis risk inherent in index insurance. Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) find that the presence of basis risk in weather insurance makes subcaste-based informal risk-sharing a complement to weather index insurance in India. Dercon et al. (2014) find similar complementarity between index insurance and informal risk sharing groups in Ethiopia. In the presence of basis risk, very risk averse individuals may have very low or no demand for index insurance (Clarke, 2016) because the disutility of the worst case scenario where they suffer a shock and receive no payouts outweighs the benefits of the insurance. However, if informal risk sharing networks can make transfers in this worst case scenario, then index insurance and informal insurance are actually complements. 24 It may be the case that migrants abroad continue to send transfers in response to shocks that do not result in insurance payments.
We should also note that the size of the average insurance payment, 3,000 and 6,000 pesos (235 -470 USD) as calculated above, is quite a bit larger than the decrease in remittances of 1,100 pesos (863 USD) per household, which indicates imperfect substitution between insurance payments and remittances. In the absence of the CADENA program, migrants abroad, who themselves may be liquidity constrained, might not be able to increase remittance payments to fully cover the relief provided by CADENA. Thus, the CADENA program likely provides a true increase in the welfare of small-holder farmers and not simply a change in the source of the relief.
Mechanisms and Discussion
There are a few potential mechanisms that can explain the observed behavior by farmers: credit constraints, learning about insurance policies, and government production goals. We argue that credit constraints are the most likely explanation. Let us first consider the last of these mechanisms.
In this scenario, the government has the goal of increasing production and achieves this goal either by directing more payments to certain farmer or farmers themselves increase production due to feelings of reciprocity. This mechanism is unlikely because the insurance is generally expected to be disbursed to all affected farmers. While the state government has some discretion to use the payments for productive investments that would benefit the community as a whole, targeted payments are unlikely to satisfy this criteria. Moreover, in order to use the insurance payment for some alternative, state or local governments have to get buy-in from the community, so it is unlikely that the community would agree to a distribution of payments that was very unequal or destined only to farmers who increase production. In terms of reciprocity, this mechanism would require that farmers who suffer negative weather shocks have enough money to expand production but prefer not to do so unless they receive insurance payments. Based on the government's concerns that weather shocks prevent farmers from planting in the next season and interviews with farmers who confirm this, this scenario seems unlikely. In interviews with farmers and program officials, neither party spoke of the government having production targets. For example, one could imagine that the local officials who deal with farmers would push them to increase production if the federal government conditioned participation in the CADENA program on increased production, but no such requirement existed.
The learning channel can occur if farmers either do not trust that payments will be made in case of a weather shock or there is some ambiguity about how the policy works. When they receive a payment following a weather shock the ambiguity and/or uncertainty is resolved, and given the promise of insurance coverage, they now find it optimal to expand the area under cultivation with insured crops. That is, we are really observing what should have been an ex-ante risk management response that was delayed due to lack of trust. Such a mechanism would be consistent with recent findings that personal experience with infrequent disaster events is an important determinant of insurance demand, even when information about the probability of these events is available (Cai and Song, 2017; Gallagher, 2014) . While we cannot definitively rule out learning, we provide evidence that it is unlikely to be the entire story. In table 5, we show the results of regressions with hectares sowed as the outcome that also include indicators for previous payments. Column 1 shows the result of a regression with three treatment lags. We see that the main effect remains significant and is similar in magnitude to previous estimates, while indicators for treatment in previous years are not significant. Column 2, includes an indicator for whether the municipality has ever received treatment in the past and an interaction of the main effect with this indicator.
While the main effect is no longer significant, the point estimate remains large and the interaction is not significant, although it is large in magnitude. If learning where the only reason for the observed effects, we would expect the impact of an insurance payment to be zero if a municipality has received a payment in the past, and is thus likely to better understand or trust the insurance product. As a result, we conclude from these results that learning is unlikely to be the only channel through which insurance payments induce increased investment and income. Note. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Observations are at the municipality-crop-year-level. Agricultural production is for the corresponding insured crop (maize, beans, sorghum, and barley). All regressions include crop fixed effects and are estimated with a linear polynomial of the running variable on a sample of observations within the optimal bandwidth of 50 mm.
That leaves us with the credit constraint mechanism, whereby farmers who received insurance payments will have more resources at the beginning of the next planting season relative to those that did not receive the payments and suffered a similarly bad harvest. The credit constraint mechanism is consistent with other papers studying the investment of cash transfers in Mexico. As previously noted, Sadoulet et al. (2001) find multipliers in the 1.5 to 2.6 range for Procampo transfers, suggesting that smallholder farmers faced credit constraints that were eased by the transfers resulting in productive investments. In the context of the Oportunidades programs, Gertler et al. (2012) find that beneficiaries invested part of the transfers and increase their agricultural income by about 10% after 18 months of benefits.
Lastly, we can also consider a model prediction of a farmer's behavior when receiving an income transfer, such as an insurance payment. Consider a risk averse farmer in a two-period model, who has a choice between spending his current wealth (w) on current consumption or inputs into production, land (A) and a second input such as fertilizer (x), which will determine his consumption in period two. If we further specify that the return to these inputs depends on a weather realization and we have a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function, we can simulate this problem and obtain the optimal level of A and x as a function of income (see appendix for model details). In figure 4 we plot x * /A * , which in a constant return to scale production function is a good indicator of yield, and A * as a function of wealth in the current period. These quantities are plotted for a scenario in which index insurance is present and one where it is not. In both cases, we see that x * /A * is constant with w, while A * is increasing in w. Moreover, the increase in A * in response to an increase in wealth is more pronounced in the scenario where index insurance is present. If we think of an insurance payment as increasing wealth at the time of planting, the predictions of this particular model are consistent with our findings of a null, although imprecisely estimated, result on yield, and a positive impact on land area under cultivation. We also provide a set of placebo tests using both pre-CADENA data, as well as municipalitylevel variables for which we should not expect a discontinuity even once CADENA is in place. 26 Table   6 shows the results of this exercise. In columns 1 and 2, we run regressions with our agricultural outcome variables of interest, prior to the institution of the CADENA program. 27 Before CADENA is in place, we should not see any effect of crossing the insurance policy threshold on outcomes in the following season because no insurance payments would be made, which is what we find. Neither the regressions shows a statistically significant result, and the point estimates are generally much smaller than what was obtained when estimating the same equation on the analysis sample.
26 The choice of variables for placebo tests is dictated by the fact that we have very few variables that vary at both the municipal and year level, which are not directly outcomes of interest.
27 Note that this test is limited to the reduced form specification because there are no payments in this time period.
We also estimate equation 1 once CADENA is rolled out. However, we use the municipal land area cultivated by small Procampo beneficiaries (< 20 hectares), which is measured before any payments are made, as the left-hand side variable. We repeat this estimation with the lagged value of log hectares planted as the left-hand side variable. If our research design is valid, these covariates should be continuous across the threshold because they are measured before any payments are made (or even precipitation is realized), and thus we should not see a statistically significant result. The results of these estimations can be found in columns 3 and 4, respectively. The coefficients of interest are not statistically significant for either outcome in either the reduced form or two-stage least squares estimations, but they are rather imprecisely estimated. In column 3 panel b, we see that going from a municipality with 0% payment to one with 100% payment, the point estimate implies a decrease of approximately 250 hectares in municipal land area cultivated by small farmers from a mean of 7412.5. In column 4, we can see that the placebo effect on lagged log hectares is about half the size of the true effect. These point estimates are not as small or as precisely estimated as we would like. Nevertheless, taken together with the other falsification tests, we believe that the bulk of the evidence supports the identification assumption. Note. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Observations are at the municipality-crop-year-level and are restricted to pre-CADENA years in columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 cover the same period as our main regressions (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . Agricultural data are for the corresponding insurable crop (maize, beans, sorghum, and barley). All regressions include crop fixed effects. All regressions are estimated with a linear polynomial on a sample of observations within the optimal bandwidth of 50 mm and include state fixed effects and municipality characteristics (e.g., population, % indigenous from the 2010 census).
This paper contributes to our understanding of the use of index insurance as a social safety net for smallholder farmers, and more broadly the literature on policy responses to climate change. We estimate the effects of payments from weather index insurance on ex-post investment decisions and coping mechanisms net of ex-ante changes in risk management. This analysis is valuable because it is carried out in the context of a large weather index insurance program with almost national coverage. In contrast to much of the existing evidence on index insurance, we are also able to observe effects over several years after the start of coverage. There exist some data limitations that negatively impact the precision and robustness of our results. Nevertheless, we believe that this analysis provides evidence that index insurance has the capacity of improving the welfare of rural households by providing them with resources to invest in the subsequent planting season, which in turn results in more land planted than would be the case without insurance payments. The payouts may also prevent households from resorting to costly coping mechanisms, such as reducing consumption, as evidenced by the result for household expenditures. Lastly, there appears to be some interaction between formal insurance payments and remittances that reduces the burden of private transfers for relief assumed by migrants. The potential benefits of index insurance are not only in coping with shocks but also in better managing risk. Because program implementation did not meet the conditions for a natural experiment, we were unable to measure these potential benefits. All in all, our results suggest that index insurance used as a social safety net may be a valuable policy tool to aid smallholder farmers who potentially face increased weather risk due to a changing climate. 
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Consider a farmer that holds some amount of wealth, w, at time t = 0. The farmer chooses to allocate his wealth w between consumption today c 0 and inputs into farm production that will result in output that he can consume in period t = 1. In terms of production, the farmer has two margins along which he can invest: expanding the amount of land sowed (A) at a cost r per unit of land and/or increasing the amount of fertilizer x at a cost of p per unit of fertilizer. Conditional on a given choice of inputs, the output at time t = 1 depends on which of the two possible states of nature, drought or no drought, is realized. We denote the production in a good year (no drought)
as f g (x, A), and the production in a bad year (drought) to be f b (x, A). As a result of the area-based index insurance, the farmer also receives a payment of m per area sowed in the bad state of the world. 28 Thus, the farmer's maximization problem is: 28 This assumption ignores the issues of basis risk, but the main result holds so long as the probability of payment is higher during a drought than in a normal year because in this setting farmers are not responsible for paying insurance premiums. Note. The points are binned values of normalized station precipitation (precipitation -insurance threshold) pooled for all three phases. The black line represents a local linear smoother, estimated separately to the left and right of the threshold, while the dashed lines are the 5% confidence interval.
